No More 'Good Character': NSW Criminal Sentencing Reform
By Tamara Psakis
Published
Topic
Legal Commentary
See
Disclaimer: Views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of other writers or the Law Student Review

On 1 February 2026, the NSW government announced that it would introduce legislation to abolish the use of ‘good character’ references in sentencing proceedings.[1]
This legislation will seek to amend the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) by repealing s 21A(3)(f),[2] which currently lists ‘good character’ as a mitigating factor which may be considered in determining the appropriate sentence for a criminal offence. Other mitigating factors, including remorse, likelihood of re-offending, pre-trial disclosure, and prospects of rehabilitation, will remain as factors which may be relied upon in reducing a convicted offender’s sentence.
This monumental criminal law reform was made in direct response to recommendations made by the NSW Sentencing Council in July 2025, which raised concerns that ‘good character’ evidence facilitates social disadvantage and heightens trauma in victim-survivors and victim family members.[3] It was also based significantly on advocacy by CSA survivors and cofounders of ‘Your Reference Ain’t Relevant’, Harrison James and Jarad Grice.[4]
I BACKGROUND
Previously, good character references could be presented during the sentencing process, after a perpetrator had been convicted of a crime. Generally, this would be in the form of a letter provided by friends and family members, as well as employers, priests or other respected community members.[5] From 2017, such references were already restricted from use in sentencing proceedings of child sexual offenders in circumstances where these good character factors assisted in the perpetrator's offence; after a Royal Commission highlighted a lack of empirical evidence to support the idea that good character would equate to improved prospects of rehabilitation.
II SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS
This current reform is not only a continuation of the prior 2017 reform justification,[6] but additionally rests on the necessary consideration of the lived experiences of victims who are already having to endure emotionally difficult sentencing hearings, which then facilitate the traumatic descriptions of their offender as a person of good character, re-traumatising the victim and minimising the impact of the offence.[7] Several submissions made to the council also reported that such references enabled the view that an offender's reputation and social status were of more importance than the direct harm caused to the victim.[8]
The Council argued that good character and morality, even if it could be assessed in a reliable and consistent manner, should not be used as a means of mitigating a sentence, nor should credible social acts; as it risks weakening the “collective conscience of society” and encourages the view that an accrue of morally good behaviour unrelated to the offence, can deplete the seriousness of the offence itself.[9]
Additionally, the Sentencing Council’s report recommended abolishing the ‘special rule’ as described in s 21(5A), which prohibits the use of good character and previous convictions in child sexual offences.[10] The reasoning for this argument was that (a) once previous convictions are divorced from good character, a lack of previous convictions becomes a narrow concept as it merely evidences a lack of prior convictions, rather than an absence of offending; and (b) that it is desirable to have a consistent approach over all offences. The new legislation introduced on Wednesday 4 February 2026 also adopted this recommendation.[11]
III CRITICISMS
One criticism of these reforms, raised in a dissenting chapter (Chapter 4) of the Sentencing Council’s report, was that the disregard for ‘good character’ could remove one means of encouraging an offender to return to lawful behaviour via positive reinforcement of ‘good character’, which aligns with the justice system’s core purpose of rehabilitation.[12] They also argue that sentencing aims to be fair and proportionate meaning the sentence should not only fit the crime, but also the perpetrator.[13] While these are notable and important arguments, it is critical to note that the remaining availability of reliance on other mitigating factors, as listed earlier, will allow these aims to continue, along with other rehabilitation and education efforts, while removing the risk of further traumatising victims of crime.
IV CONCLUSION
This reform is an exceptional step in increasing focus and compassion toward the victims of crimes and away from allowing the reputations of perpetrators to shadow the harmful impact of their crime. While the impact of this reform on criminal defence is important to recognise, one must also be aware of the remaining existence of other mitigating factors, such as their prospects of rehabilitation and likelihood of re-offending.
This reform ensures that victims, victim-survivors, and the family members of victims can achieve fair justice which does not remain shadowed or diminished by the social status of the perpetrator of crimes against them; and does not exacerbate the traumatic impacts of violent crime. Reforms in future should seek to strike a similar balance of fair justice for the offender and the victim.
V FOOTNOTES
[1] Attorney General, ‘NSW to abolish ‘good character’ at sentencing (Media Release, NSW Government, 1 February 2026).
[2] Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 NSW s 21A(3)(f); Ibid.
[3] Attorney General, ‘NSW to abolish ‘good character’ at sentencing (Media Release, NSW Government, 1 February 2026).
[4] Full Stop Australia, Submission to NSW Sentencing Council, Good Character at Sentencing (February 2025) 2.
[5] New South Wales Sentencing Council, Good Character at Sentencing (Report, July 2025) 86.
[6] Ibid 33.
[7] Ibid 8.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid 33.
[10] Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(5A).
[11] Attorney General, ‘NSW to abolish ‘good character’ at sentencing (Media Release, NSW Government, 1 February 2026).
[12] Ibid 58.
[13] Ibid.